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PRETRIAL BAIL: A DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The term "bail" encompasses several interrelated concepts. Bail refers
to a monetary or nonmonetary obligation that a criminal defendant under-
takes to procure his release pending trial or appeal.1 Bail also connotes
a criminal defendant's status once the defendant is at liberty pending trial
or appeal.2 In addition, bail signifies a procedural scheme by which a court
determines the propriety of a defendant's release and decides what
accompanying release conditions are appropriate under the circumstances.,
The federal Bail Reform Act of 1966' (the Act) is an example of a pretrial
' See Manning v. State ex rel Williams, 190 Okla. 65, __, 120 P.2d 980, 981 (1942)
(bail refers to method by which defendant procures release while awaiting trial); BALLEN-
TINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (3d ed. 1969) (one meaning of word "bail" is monetary or non-
monetary security that defendant gives to gain release pending trial).
2 See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 111 (unabr. ed. 1969)
(bail signifies condition of being free from custody pending attendance at judicial proceeding).
See generally Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App.2d 827, -, 300 P.2d 187, 190-91 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1956) (term "bail" means several things, including security given for release pend-
ing trial or appeal and status of defendant that has procured release).
See United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 579 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (bail encom-
passes procedural scheme by which court determines monetary or nonmonetary release
conditions for criminal defendants).
18 U.S.C. SS 3141-3152 (1976). The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the Act) establishes pro-
cedures for the pretrial release of federal defendants in capital and noncapital cases and
for release pending appeal. See id. §§ 3141-3148. Section 3146 of the Act provides a hierar-
chical list of available release conditions. See id. S 3146; see also infra notes 146-51 and ac-
companying text (discussion of hierarchy of release conditions under the Act). In noncapital
cases, a court decides the appropriate release condition or conditions by determining the
least restrictive measure for reasonably assuring a defendant's attendance at trial. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146; S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]; see United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 749-50 (4th Cir. 1970) (judicial officer
at bail hearing should impose least onerous release condition necessary to minimize risk
of nonappearance); United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court must
establish least restrictive bail condition that reasonably will ensure defendant's attendance).
In capital cases, a court determines the additional issue of whether a defendant's release
would constitute a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. S 3148. A decision concerning
release pending appeal involves the issue of a good faith motivation for the appeal, along
with risk of flight or danger to the community. See id.; see also Harris v. United States,
404 U.S. 1232, 1232-33 (1971) (bail hearing pending appeal involves issues of flight, danger
to community, and motivation for appeal).
Like the federal Act, many state bail statutes provide courts with a variety of release
conditions, treat pretrial release differently than release pending appeal, distinguish be-
tween pretrial release in capital and noncapital cases, and require courts to consider the
circumstances of a particular case when determining the appropriate bail conditions. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-4-101 to -205 (Repl. 1978 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 54-53 to -53a, 54-63a to -63g, 54-64a to -76a (West Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. 55 29-901
to -910 (Repl. 1979); N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAW §§ 510.10-540.30 (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1982-1983); N.D. R. CRAi. P. 46.
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release scheme that favors the pretrial release of criminal defendants
facing noncapital charges' and that provides courts with a choice of several
measures to ensure a defendant's attendance at trial.'
Scholars disagree whether a federal pretrial release system is a con-
stitutional or merely a statutory requirement.7 The prevailing constitu-
tional rationale for bail is that a right to bail, although not absolute, is
implicit in the eighth amendment prohibition against the imposition of
excessive bail.8 A supplemental proposition is that a procedural scheme
of pretrial release is necessary to preserve the presumption of innocence
inherent in American jurisprudence.' Controversy exists, however, con-
' See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. SS 3141-3152 (1976) (establishing liberal pretrial
release system for federal courts); FED. R. GRIM. P. 46(g) (mandating judicial scrutiny of
pretrial detention of defendants to avoid unnecessary confinement); see also Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (federal bail statute indicates expansion
of procedural and substantive rights for criminal defendants); H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. __ (purpose of federal bail act is to increase availability of pretrial release),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2293, 2295-300 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-8 (new federal bail act revises existing bail
practices and provides alternatives to monetary bail practices and provides alternatives
to monetary bail conditions to facilitate pretrial release).
' See 18 U.S.C. S 3146 (1976) (release conditions for criminal defendants); infra notes
146-51 and accompanying text (discussion of various release conditions under the Act).
I Compare H. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 691 (4th ed. 1927)
(right to bail implicit in eighth amendment) and Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis
in Bail (pt. 1), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 965-89 (1965) (historical analysis of eighth amend-
ment suggests that right to bail is implicit in Constitution) with Duker, The Right to Bail:
A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 34 (1977) (right to bail only statutory). See generally
Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 328 (1982) (analysis of controversy concerning source of right to bail) [hereinafter cited
as Historical Perspectives]. Federal court decisions evince judicial disagreement concerning
the source of a right to bail. Compare Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice 1955) (eighth amendment protects fundamental right to bail) with Kelly v.
Springett, 527 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to bail for federal criminal defendants
derives from federal statute).
' See, e.g., Herzog v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955)
(citing eighth amendment for proposition that bail is fundamental right); Hunt v. Roth, 648
F.2d 1148, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 1981) (eighth amendment guarantees right to bail), vacated as
moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam); HOUSE REPORT, supra note
5, (right to bail implicit in eighth amendment), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2296; see also United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659-62 (Butler, Circuit Justice
1926) (right to pretrial release upon payment of monetary bail is implicit in eighth amend-
ment); H. BLACK, supra note 7, at 691 (even absent express statutory or constitutional pro-
vision establishing right to bail, right is implicit in excessive bail clause). But see infra notes
134-81 and accompanying text (support exists for conclusion that right to bail derives from
due process clause of Constitution).
' See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (bail necessary to preserve presumption of
innocence); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (presumption of innocence supports
a right to bail, United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961) (bail is necessary
to assure consistency with presumption of innocence); Historical Perspectives, supra note
7, at 356-59 (right to bail is necessary to protect presumption of innocence).
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cerning the scope of an eight amendment right to bail."° A more logical,
but typically overlooked, source for a right to bail is the constitutional
guarantee that due process will accompany any deprivation of life, liberty
or property.11 A due process rationale provides a more sound and helpful
standard for resolving uncertainties surrounding the nature and scope
of the right to bail than an eighth amendment analysis.
12
American bail practices are rooted in the English common law. 13 Two
significant concerns in the development of the English common law were
the prevalence of unnecessary incarceration and the possibility of improper
release of defendants awaiting trial. 4 Cases involving pretrial imprison-
ment without bail 5 prompted legislation to ensure the English equivalent
of "due process" in criminal cases." Although an absolute common-law
,1 See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L.
REV. 1223, 1224 (1969) (disagreement exists concerning scope of eighth amendment right
to bail). One view concerning an eighth amendment right to bail is that the only legitimate
issue at a bail hearing is the risk of a defendant's flight. Historical Perspectives, supra note
7, at 335-40; see 18 U.S.C. S 3146 (1976) (issue at bail hearing in noncapital case is likelihood
of defendant's nonappearance at trial). Another interpretation of an eighth amendment right
to bail is that a bail determination should include the risk of flight and the risk of danger
to the community. Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at 346-49; see 18 U.S.C. 5 3148 (1976)
(two issues at bail hearing in capital case are risk of flight and risk of danger to community).
" See infra notes 36-53, 158-81 and accompanying text (due process rationale for bail
is more logical than eighth amendment analysis). Discussions concerning bail that identify
due process as the source of a right to bail are uncommon and merely conclusory. See Johnson
v. County of Westchester, No. 81 Civ. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (due process requires system of pretrial release for criminal defen-
dants); United States ex rel Kilheffer v. Plowfield, No. 74-2347 (ED. Pa. Feb. 24, 1976) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (due process encompasses right to reasonable bail con-
ditions); I. KLEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 101 (1980) (due
process implicitly guarantees opportunity for release on bail); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 667 (4th ed. 1873) (defendant's right to give securi-
ty to effect pretrial release derives from constitutional protection of life, liberty and prop-
erty); cf. Ex parte McDaniel, - Fla. . -, 97 So. 317, 318 (1923) (due process clause
of state constitution requires bail system).
11 See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (judicial interpretation and applica-
tion of due process clause demonstrate that due process would provide more logical source
for right to bail than eighth amendment).
13 See Duker, supra note 7, at 34-86 (English common law furnishes background for
American bail practices); Foote, supra note 7, at 965-89 (examination of development of
bail in England necessary to understand American concept of bail). See generally E. DE
HAAS, THE ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL (1940) (comprehensive historical analysis of bail).
'" See Foote, supra note 7, 965-68 (bail developed in England to reduce incarceration
of unconvicted defendants and to minimize governmental expense); Historical Perspectives,
supra note 7, at 341-42 (one purpose underlying English bail system was prevention of cor-
rupt practices of local officials that improperly granted bail).
"1 See Jenkes' Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 1189 (1676); Darnel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627);
see also Foote, supra note 7, at 966-68 (discussion of facts and consequences of Darnel and
Jenkes).
11 See Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2, S 10 (providing that officials should
not impose excessive bail); Habeas Corpus Act, 1679,31 Car. 2, ch. 2, S 9 (proscribing abusive
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right to bail did not exist, statutory law provided for bail in certain classes
of offenses." In the mid-nineteenth century, Parliament made the deci-
sion to grant or deny pretrial release completely within a judge's
discretion."
In the American colonies, several precursors to the Constitution ex-
pressly guaranteed a right to bail in noncapital cases. 9 Subsequently,
however, the drafters of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution did not
include a provision expressly granting a right to bail.0 The only reference
to bail that the drafters included was a prohibition against the imposition
of excessive bail conditions."' Soon after the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
arrest and pretrial imprisonment practices); Petition of Rights, 1628, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1 (requir-
ing that officials inform accused of specific charges thus enabling accused to seek bail if
offense bailable); see also Foote, supra note 7, at 965-66 (discussion of seventeenth century
parliamentary acts that provided protections for defendants' opportunities for pretrial
release).
1 See Foote, supra note 7, at 968 (prior to nineteenth century right to bail in England
depended upon statutory classification of certain offenses as bailable); see also Duker, supra,
note 7, at 77 (no absolute right to bail existed in England). At the time of the drafting
of the American Constitution, English statutory law did not permit pretrial release for
felonies such as murder, treason or arson. See Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch.
12. Defendants were entitled to bail for minor offenses such as a first offense of petit larceny
or a trespass that was not punishable by death or loss of limb. Id.
" See Foote, supra note 7, at 979 (England made bail discretionary by parliamentary
act of 1826).
" See An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-
west of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), 13 July 1787, art. 2 (granting unconditional
right to bail in noncapital cases), reprinted in I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION 168, 168 (M. Jensen ed. 1976); see also Massachusetts Body of
Liberties S 18 (1641) (right to release on bail except in capital cases and for contempt of
court when express legislative provision exists), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (W. Swindler ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS]; New York Charter of Liberties and Privileges S 19 (1683), (right to pretrial
bail except in treason or felony cases), reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at
165. See generally Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 958 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussion of various
colonial constitutions that granted right to bail); Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at
334-39 (discussion of early colonial charters that protected right to bail in noncapital cases).
Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 pursuant to the Articles of Con-
federation. Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at 338. The drafters of the Constitution
omitted a provision expressly granting a right to bail, but Congress subsequently included
a right-to-bail provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, S
33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789); see also Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at 338 (Judiciary Act
of 1789 did contain express right-to-bail provision but Bill of Rights to Constitution did
not). The omission of an express constitutional right-to-bail provision may indicate the
Framers' intention to leave the bail issue to Congress. See Duker, supra note 7, at 86;
Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at 338. But see Foote, supra note 7, at 984-89 (omission
of express right to bail clause in Constitution was merely accidental). Alternatively, the
omission may suggest that a constitutional provision other than the eighth amendment pro-
tects a conditional right to bail. See infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text (due process
clause logically requires a system of pretrial release).
I See U.S. CONST. amend. VHI (limiting amount of bail that court may impose, but
no mention of right to bail).
21 See id. (prohibition against imposition of excessive bail).
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the first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,22 which provided for
pretrial release through bail for defendants in noncapital cases.'
United States Supreme Court cases during the century following the
adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the Judiciary Act con-
tain only limited discussions concerning the nature of bail.24 The Court
characterized the function of bail in criminal cases as a means of reasonably
ensuring a defendant's appearance at trail and his availability for
judgment." The Court emphasized that federal statutory law established
bail as a matter of right in noncapital cases.26 The Supreme Court thus
considered bail a procedural scheme for promoting efficient law enforce-
ment while preserving the presumption of innocence that American
jurisprudence accords criminal defendantsY Similarly, early decisions by
other federal courts characterized bail as a practical means for securing
a defendant's presence at trial while protecting the defendant's liberty
interests.28
Federal courts continue to regard bail as a compromise between a
government's interest in effective law enforcement and an individual's
liberty interest." One of the current theories of bail" is that the eighth
amendment implies a right to bail." The eighth amendment provides that
= Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, S 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789).
See id. (requiring pretrial release on bail in all noncapital cases).
See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussion of nineteenth century Supreme
Court cases that contain references to nature and purpose of bail).
' See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (purpose of bail in criminal
cases is to create significant probability that defendant will appear at trial); accord United
States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 736-37 (1884) (bail in criminal cases reasonably assures court
of opportunity to have defendant present for trial and judgment).
I See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285-87 (1895) (right to bail in noncapital cases
derives from federal statutory law).
I See id. at 285 (bail is means to protect presumption of innocence while ensuring
effective administration of criminal justice system).
I See, e.g., In re Gannon, 27 F.2d 362, 362-64 (E.D. Pa. 1928) (bail is judicial process
for reasonably assuring defendant's presence at trial while protecting defendant's liberty
interests); United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659-62 (Butler, Circuit Justice 1926) (bail
safeguards defendant's rights yet assures likelihood of appearance at trial); United States
v. Feely, 25 F. Cas. 1055, 1057 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 15,082) (bail balances governmental
interest in effective law enforcement against defendant's interest in remaining free prior
to conviction).
I See Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197, 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960) (bail
is practice that weighs interests of defendant in avoiding confinement against governmen-
tal interest in preventing defendant's flight); In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 337-38 (1st Cir.
1970) (bail system reconciles conflict between individual's liberty interest and governmen-
tal interest in efficient law enforcement); see also Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157-58 (8th
Cir. 1981) (bail process balances individual interests against legitimate governmental objec-
tives), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam).
I See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (view that source of right to bail is
eighth amendment); infra note 44 and accompanying text (theory that presumption of in-
nocence requires bail); infra note 53 and accompanying text (view that right to bail depen-
dent upon statute).
S1 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (some courts and legal scholars have con-
cluded that eighth amendment is source of right to bail).
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a court shall not impose excessive bail conditions.' Courts have interpreted
"excessive bail" to mean any condition of pretrial release that is un-
necessarily restrictive in a particular case.' The uncertainty of a particular
defendant's appearance pursuant to a summons is the issue that deter-
mines the degree of restrictiveness necessary to minimize the risk of
nonappearance.3 4 The eighth amendment, therefore, implies a right to
pretrial release upon conditions that are reasonable under the particular
circumstances.2 5
An eighth amendment rationale for bail is questionable, however,
because the nature of the eighth amendment is merely prohibitory with
respect to unreasonable sentencing or bail results." The restrictive pro-
visions of the eighth amendment limit governmental authority to prescribe
law enforcement measures." The cruel and unusual punishment clause,38
for example, does not furnish a right to legal procedures that must
accompany the imposition of punishment.3 9 Neither does the punishment
clause provide standards to evaluate the process that results in the senten-
cing of criminal defendants. 0 The eighth amendment is only a check upon
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting imposition of excessive bail).
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (bail is excessive if more stringent than
reasonably necessary to assure defendant's attendance at trial); United States v. James,
674 F.2d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 1982) (test for excessive bail is whether risk of flight in par-
ticular case justifies bail that court has imposed).
' See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (issue underlying imposition of release condi-
tions is need to increase likelihood of particular defendant's attendance at trial); Koen v.
Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1391-92 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (bail conditions are alternatives to sum-
mons and are legitimate only when related to risk of nonappearance in particular case),
off d per curiam, 428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
' See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157-62 (8th Cir. 1981) (eighth amendment requires
that bail conditions be reasonable under particular circumstances of case), vacated as moot
sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam); Meechaicum v. Fountain, 537
F. Supp. 1098,1099 (D. Kan. 1982) (eighth amendment guarantees that court will not impose
bail condition more stringent than necessary to ensure defendant's attendance at trial).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (proscribing "excessive" bail or fines and "cruel and
unusual" punishment), infra notes 3743 and accompanying text (eighth amendment is merely
quantitative limitation on imposition of bail or punishment).
" See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1977) (eighth amendment limits
legislative and judicial authority to prescribe measures for law enforcement).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (3d Cir. 1976)
(cruel and unusual punishment clause not applicable prior to conviction); see also Lock v.
Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 491 n.7, 492 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981) (eighth amendment punishment clause
creates only post-conviction rights for criminal defendants concerning type and amount of
punishment). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (right to procedures governing arrests
and searches or seizures of evidence during criminal investigations); id. amend. V (right
to grand jury indictment for certain offenses, protection against double jeopardy and pro-
hibition against involuntary self-incrimination in criminal cases); id. amend. VI (right to
procedures governing criminal trials, such as speedy and public trial by jury, notice to defen-
dant of specific charges against him, confrontation of hostile witnesses and representation
by counsel).
" See United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129, 1133 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (due process
[Vol. 40:1575
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the type and amount of punishment that the legislature may authorize
and a court may impose. 1 Similarly, the eighth amendment proscription
of excessive bail is merely a quantitative limit on the imposition of bail
conditions.42 Both the punishment and the bail provisions of the eighth
amendment, therefore, presume the existence of, but do not create, an
underlying right."3
Courts and legal scholars have considered an eighth amendment right
to bail a necessary corollary to the presumption of innocence because,
absent bail, defendants regularly would remain in jail pending an adjudica-
tion of guilt or innocence." The presumption of innocence, however, is
not a sound basis for a right to bail. 5 While the Constitution does not
expressly recognize that an accused is presumptively innocent until an
adjudication of guilt, the presumption is a fundamental evidentiary prin-
clause furnishes general standard for evaluating proceedings that result in imposition of
punishment), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973); Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1139-41
(D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764) (due process clause is general constitutional check on procedures
that government follows to effect punishment of criminal defendant); U.S. CONST. amends.
IV-VI (specific constitutional provisions governing arrest and prosecution of criminal
defendants).
'1 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (eighth amendment is restriction
upon types of conduct that legislature can define as criminal and form or amount of punish-
ment that legislature can authorize and that court can impose); Weems v. United State,
217 U.S. 349, 371, 378-82 (1910) (eighth amendment is check on legislative definition of crimes
and on duration or conditions of imprisonment); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1981) (eighth amendment provides post-conviction right concerning amount of
punishment).
42 See Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963) (eighth amendment
prohibits imposition of excessive bail but does not create any substantive pretrial rights);
Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1391-92 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (eighth amendment only limits
amount of monetary bail), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923 (1971); accord People ex rel Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 398,
49 N.E.2d 498,500 (1943) (history of bail in America demonstrates that excessive bail clause
only limits amount of bail and does not imply right to bail).
I See Meechaicum v. Fountain, 537 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (D. Kan. 1982) (eighth amend-
ment not applicable to state defendant unless express statutory or state constitutional right
to bail exists); supra notes 39-41 (eighth amefidment is not the source of procedural rights
of defendants concerning arrest, prosecution, and conviction resulting in imposition of punish-
ment); see also Duker, supra note 7, at 77-89 (eighth amendment depends upon independent
source for right to bail).
" See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (presumption of innocence supports conclu-
sion that eighth amendment protects fundamental right to bail); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d
1148, 1156 (8th Cir. 1981) (eighth amendment and presumption of innocence provide sound
bases for right to reasonable bail), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478
(1982) (per curiam); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961) (importance
of bail derives from presumption of innocence inherent in American jurisprudence); Historical
Perspectives, supra note 7, at 358-59 (right to bail is consistent with presumption of innocence);
see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6 (liberal pretrial release opportunities assure
viability of presumption of innocence).
"5 See infra notes 46-51 (presumption of innocence is not logical support for pretrial
release opportunities).
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ciple that governs criminal trials.46 The presumption of innocence requires
that the prosecution prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
before a court may impose a fine or imprisonment.47 If the presumption
of innocence were a substantive right in criminal cases, any pretrial restric-
tions on a defendant's liberty would be impermissible.4 8 Instead, both
pretrial detention and release conditions depend upon a prior showing
of probable cause before a judicial officer. 9 The presumption of innocence
does not bar such restrictions on a defendant's liberty, because probable
cause means that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a particular
defendant has committed a particular crime.0 Neither does the presump-
tion preclude detention or conditional release of admittedly innocent per-
sons, such as material witnesses or jurors." The presumption of innocence
concept, therefore, is neither relevant nor helpful to a system of pretrial
release of criminal defendants.52
The lack of logical and historical support for an eighth amendment
right to bail has led some courts and scholars to conclude that a right
to bail is totally dependent upon statutory provisions.' A logical alter-
" See Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)
(presumption of innocence is evidentiary principle, not substantive right); Blunt v. United
States, 322 A.2d 579,584 (D.C. 1974) (presumption of innocence does not create any substan-
tive pretrial rights); Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1231-32 (presumption of innocence is not
substantive right, but rather rule of evidence).
17 See Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584 (D.C. 1974) (presumption of innocence
is principle that requires prosecution to carry burden of proof in criminal trials).
" See Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)
(if presumption of innocence were fundamental right any pretrial restrictions on defendant
would be unconstitutional in capital and noncapital cases); Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d
579, 584 (D.C. 1974) (if presumption of innocence were substantive principle any pretrial
detention would be per se unconstitutional); Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1231-32 (any restric-
tions upon defendant's liberty pending final adjudication of guilt would be inconsistent with
an absolute presumption of innocence); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (due pro-
cess clause, rather than eighth amendment or presumption of innocence, is what furnishes
criminal defendants a right concerning conditions of pretrial confinement).
" See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-19 (1975) (fourth amendment requires judicial
determination of probable cause to legitimize pretrial restriction on defendant's liberty)
Id. at 111-12.
51 See 18 U.S.C. 5 3149 (1976) (authorizing custody or conditional release of material
witnesses); see also United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 351-53 (7th Cir.) (trial court
has authority in criminal case to place jury in custody of federal marshall to prevent pre-
judicial influences), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (presumption of innocence is not related
logically to right to bail).
' See Duker, supra note 7, at 67-86 (historical background of eighth amendment
demonstrated intention of drafters to make right to bail dependent on statute); Mitchell,
supra note 10, at 1224-35 (background of eighth amendment does not support constitutional
right to bail and suggests that bail is dependent on statutory provision); see also Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (eighth amendment does not limit authority of Congress
to define scope of right to bail) (dicta); United States ex rel Covington v. Coparo, 297 F.
Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (congressional power to restrict scope of right to bail is sub-
ject only to constitutional proscriptions of arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory
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native conclusion, however, is that the constitutional source for a right
to bail is the due process clause of the fifth amendment.' The due pro-
cess clause expressly guarantees that established procedures will accom-
pany all deprivations of life, liberty or property.' The procedural due pro-
cess concept has developed as a protection for personal rights and interests
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but encompassed general-
ly within the term "liberty."5 The goal of due process is fundamental
fairness, 7 which means the minimization of the risk of erroneous or ar-
bitrary deprivations of life, liberty or property." The specific requirements
legislative conduct). See generally Historical Perspectives, supra note 7, at 340-46 (discussion
of view that right to bail only statutory).
' See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (interpretation of due process clause);
infra notes 60-133 and accompanying text (due process is basis for procedural rights in
situations analogous to pretrial bail); infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (judicial
precedent demonstrates applicability of due process to bail issues).
S U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides pro-
tection against federal governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property by requiring
that procedural safeguards accompany the deprivation. Id. Similarly, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires procedural protections to accompany state govern-
mental deprivations of life, liberty or property. Id. amend. XIV.
11 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (due process requires protection
of interests generally recognized as fundamental even though not specifically enumerated
in constitution or statute). Procedural due process applies to specific constitutional rights,
as well as general liberty and property interests. For example, no express constitutional
right to welfare benefits exists. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (person
does not have constitutional right to welfare benefits). The Supreme Court, however, re-
quires an adversarial hearing pursuant to the due process clause before discontinuation
of welfare benefits because a welfare recipient acquires a property interest in the continua-
tion of the benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970). See generally Grey,
Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS 186-202 (1977) (courts have
abandoned distinction between judicially protected rights and nonenforceable privileges
to provide protection for commonly recognized interests); Resnick, Due Process and Pro-
cedural Justice, in DUE PROCESS 206-27 (1977) (applicability of procedural due process
depends on current social values, Comment, People v. Ramirez: A New Liberty Interest
Expands Due Process Protections, CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1075-78 (1981) (due process protec-
tions attach to federal or state constitutional rights, statutory rights and interests recognized
at common law).
In construing the scope of the due process clause, the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the term "liberty" broadly. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958)
(right to travel is form of liberty that government cannot restrict without satisfying due
process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("liberty" does not mean only physical
freedom but also includes right to contract freely, to choose occupation, to marry and other
privileges fundamental at common law); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897)
(liberty is broad term which includes right to be free from physical restraint and to choose
place of residence or livelihood).
I See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1080 (9th Cir. 1972) (essence of due pro-
cess right is fundamental fairness); Cox v. Burke, 361 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir.) (goal of due
process protections is fundamental fairness), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966).
1 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-27 (1979) (goal of due process protections
in civil commitment cases is to minimize risk of erroneous or arbitrary commitment); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-15 (1950) (due process protections
such as notice and hearing ensure fairness and propriety of deprivation of life, liberty or
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of due process, therefore, vary according to the nature of the issue and
the importance of the interests at stake.59
The due process clause, for example, requires procedural safeguards
in both punitive and nonpunitive deprivation of liberty situations.' Both
pretrial incarceration and conditional release of criminal defendants con-
stitute nonpunitive deprivations of liberty.' Federal courts use a due pro-
cess analysis, under either the fifth or the fourteenth amendment, 2 to
determine the issue, standard of proof and type of hearing necessary to
legitimize nonpunitive deprivations of liberty that are analogous to pretrial
restrictions for criminal defendants.6' In Addington v. Texas," the Supreme
Court addressed the standard of proof necessary to satisfy due process
in civil commitment proceedings. Under the Texas commitment scheme,
property in particular case); see also Grey, supra note 56, at 183-84 (purpose of due process
protections is fair and accurate results in adjudication). See generally Roper & Melone, Does
Procedural Due Process Make a Difference?, 65 JUDICATURE 136, 13641 (1981) (study of second
trials following reversal for procedural error indicates different outcomes in majority of cases).
" See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (due process operates as continuum
of procedural protection according to importance of correct result in particular type of case);
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-43 (1960) (extent of due process that is constitutionally
required depends upon nature of issue and type of proceeding). Due process protections
attach to matters outside traditional civil or criminal litigation. For example, due process
requires that administrative agency determinations concerning the discontinuation of welfare
benefits include an adversarial hearing to protect a recipient's property interest in the
continuation of the benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970). Due process
also protects the right of public school students to be free from arbitrary or excessive cor-
poral punishment by school officials. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-75 (1977).
1 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (due process provides protec-
tion for wide range of liberty interests beyond actual imprisonment); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (due process protections attach to all deprivations of liberty or prop-
erty); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (due process protects against
unreasonable restrictions on liberty generally, not just punishment).
"1 See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157-63 (8th Cir. 1981) (punishment is impermissi-
ble justification for pretrial restrictions on criminal defendant's liberty or property), vacated
as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam), HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 5 (purpose of pretrial restrictions for criminal defendants is administrative efficiency
not punishment), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2295; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 1-10 (bail is nonpunitive deprivation of liberty).
' Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (federal government shall not deprive person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law) with id. amend. XIV (state cannot deprive
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law). See generally supra notes
55-59, infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (explanation of due process analysis).
' See infra notes 65-110 and accompanying text (due process analysis determines pro-
cedural protections necessary in civil commitment cases); infra notes 121-33 and accom-
panying text (due process is source of procedural safeguards that accompany detention
or conditional release of material witnesses).
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
See id. at 421-33. The appellant in Addington challenged the constitutionality of his
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital on the ground that the commitment hearing
did not comport with due process. Id. at 421-22. Addington argued that due process re-
quired the state to prove a need for commitment beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 427-31.
In Addington, the trial court had instructed the jury on a "clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
[Vol. 40:1575
PRETRIAL BAIL
the state's power to confine a person involuntarily depended upon a show-
ing that the person was mentally ill and was dangerous to himself or to
others.6 The only fact at issue at Addington's commitment hearing had
been whether Addington was a danger to himself or others."' The
Addington court rejected the state's argument that the state only needed
to establish Addington's danger potential by a preponderance of the
evidence.68 Because civil commitment constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty, the Court required a higher standard of proof than the
preponderance standard applicable in civil adjudication of monetary or
other property interests. 9
The Addington Court reasoned that fixing a standard of proof in com-
mitment cases is an important step in achieving fundamental fairness.
70
ing" standard of proof. Id. at 421. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals had reversed and held
that the appropriate standard of proof was the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Id.
at 422. The Texas Supreme Court, however, had reinstated the trial court decision and
held that the applicable standard of proof in civil commitment cases was the preponderance
of the evidence standard. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court determined that
a preponderance standard was too lenient and that a reasonable doubt standard was too
strict. Id. at 425-31. The Court held that a clear and convincing evidence standard was suffi-
ciently protective to satisfy due process. Id. at 431-33.
The preponderance standard applicable in most civil litigation means that the total credi-
ble evidence must convince a fact-finder that the alleged fact is more likely true than un-
true. McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 339 at 793-96 (E. Cleary ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF L.
REV. 242, 247-51 (1944). The standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings requires
that the trier of fact must have no reasonable doubt that an allegation of the prosecution
is true. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); MCCORrdnCK, supra, § 341 at 798-802;
McBaine, supra, at 255-58. The clear and convincing level falls somewhere between the
preponderance and reasonable doubt standards and means that a high probability must
exist that the allegation is true. MCCORMICK, supra, S 340 at 796-98; McBaine, supra, at
251-54. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE S 7.6 at 243-45 (1977) (discus-
sion of preponderance, clear and convincing, and reasonable doubt standards of proof).
' 441 U.S. at 420-21; see TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN arts. 5547-40 to -57 (Vernon 1958
& Supp. 1982) (civil commitment provisions).
1 441 U.S. at 421. In Addington, the appellant had undergone temporary commitment
to mental institutions seven times and indefinite commitment three times during the ten
year period prior to the case. Id. at 420. The Addington case arose when Addington's mother
petitioned for his indefinite commitment following Addington's arrest for threatened assault
against his mother. Id. At the commitment hearing, Addington conceded that he was men-
tally ill but argued that sufficient evidence did not exist concerning danger to himself or
others. Id. at 421.
See id. at 425-27.
"' Id. The Addington Court determined that due process requires a higher standard
of proof in civil commitment cases than in civil litigation involving strictly monetary or
other property interests because liberty is more important than property. See id. at 425-27.
The Court analogized civil commitment to certain types of civil adjudication, such as depor-
tation and fraud cases, in which the more stringent standard of clear and convincing evidence
applies. Id. at 424. The clear and convincing standard applies in civil cases in which a special
potential for deception exists or in which special individual interests, such as liberty or
reputation, are at stake. See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, S 340 at 797-98.
71 See 441 U.S. at 424.
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The applicable standard of proof, therefore, should reflect the importance
of accuracy in a particular type of proceeding." The Court determined
the need for accuracy in civil commitment cases by weighing the interests
of the parties. 2 An individual has a strong interest in avoiding physical
restraint and the attendant social and psychological stigma of
commitment. 3 The state government has a valid interest in caring for
mentally impaired citizens 4 and in protecting the public against poten-
tially dangerous individuals.' The state, however, also has a pecuniary
interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement and treatment. 6 The Ad-
dington Court, therefore, found that the importance of avoiding improper
confinement outweighed the state's interest in the treatment and custody
of mentally ill persons." The Court held that a "clear and convincing"
standard of proof 8 was necessary under the due process clause to reduce
the possibility of erroneous commitment. 9
Due process also requires judicial determination of the proper issue
before civil commitment of a person.' In Jackson v. Indiana,"' the Supreme
" Id. at 423-27.
7 See id. at 425-26; see also infra text accompanying notes 73-75 (discussion of par-
ticular interests of parties in Addington).
71 441 U.S. at 425-26.
11 Id. In civil commitment cases, the state's parens patriae power to care for citizens
provides the ground for authority to confine persons that are unable to care for themselves.
Id. at 426.
71 Id. A state has authority under the police power to confine involuntarily a mentally
ill person when the person poses a danger to the community. Id.; see Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 136-38 (1894) (police power of state extends generally to protection of public
health, safety, and morals). The constitutional basis for the police power is the tenth amend-
ment of the Constitution. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S.
264, 291 (1981); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967 (W).
Mo. 1982); see U.S. CONST. amend X (absent constitutional delegation of power to federal
government or limit on state power, state retains authority).
78 See 441 U.S. at 426 (state has no interest in erroneous confinement of person in
mental institution); Cf. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-2 (unnecessary pretrial incarcera-
tion of criminal defendants imposes financial burden on government).
441 U.S. at 427.
78 See supra note 65 (discussion of clear and convincing standard of proof).
441 U.S. at 424-25, 432-33. In Addington, the appellant argued that due process re-
quired the use of the reasonable doubt standard in civil commitment cases because commit-
ment is analogous to incarceration in a penal institution. Id. at 427-28. Addington argued
that the Court previously had applied the reasonable doubt standard to adjudications out-
side the criminal context, namely juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id. The Addington Court
determined that delinquency proceedings were analogous to criminal proceedings because
the issue in both types of cases is the commission of a crime. Id. The Addington Court
distinguished civil commitment from both criminal and juvenile adjudications because the
resulting confinement is not punitive. Id. The Court also stated that failure to commit a
mentally ill person is more harmful to the person than acquittal of a guilty defendant is
to the defendant. Id. at 428-29.
o See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text (civil commitment for indefinite period
of time must rest upon judicial determination of person's lack of capacity to function in
community or of potential danger to community).
81 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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Court reviewed Indiana's scheme for confinement of a criminal defendant
on the ground of incompentency to stand trial. 2 The Indiina commitment
statute permitted a court with reasonable grounds to suspect a competency
problem to appoint examining physicians, to order a competency hearing
upon the physicians' recommendation and, after a finding of incompeten-
cy, to commit the defendant to a psychiatric facility until the defendant
regained competency. Indiana also had two separate statutory provisions
authorizing the indefinite commitment of "feeble-minded" or "mentally
ill" persons.' A finding of feeble-mindedness required a showing that the
person was unable to care for himself. A finding of mental illness re-
quired a showing that the person was a danger to himself or to others. 8
Commitment procedures for a feeble-minded or a mentally ill person in-
cluded notice, a full judicial hearing, representation by counsel and right
of appeal.' The duration of confinement for feeble-minded and mentally
ill persons depended upon a continuing need for treatment or custody.88
The release of an incompetent defendant, however, required a finding of
restored competency.' Jackson, a deaf-mute, had the mental capacity of
a preschooler.9° Pending Jackson's trial on two counts of robbery, the state
trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Jackson.9 At the
resulting competency hearing, the trial court found that Jackson was in-
competent to stand trial due to his physical and mental disability and
minimal communication skills." The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's decision and rejected Jackson's argument that the poor prog-
Id. at 728.
1 Id. at 721-24; see IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971) (procedure for determining competency
to stand trial), amended by IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns Repl. 1979) Competency to
stand trial requires sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the trial and
to assist in the preparation of a defense. 406 U.S. at 721.
" 406 U.S. at 722-24; see IND. CODE S 16-15-1-3 (1971) (commitment of feeble-minded
persons) (repealed 1978); id. §§ 16-14-9-1 to -31 (commitment of mentally ill persons general-
ly), amended by IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-9.1-1 to -18 (Burns Repl. 1979).
406 U.S. at 721-22.
' Id. at 723.
" Id. at 728.
Id. at 728-31.
Id. In Jackson, the Supreme Court determined that Indiana had violated Jackson's
constitutional rights by confining him indefinitely on the basis of incompetency to stand
trial. Id. at 720-21. Jackson's confinement was unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause because the difference in standards for commitment and release of criminal defen-
dants and civilly committed persons was unreasonable. Id. at 723-31. The durational nature
of Jackson's commitment was also a deprivation of liberty without due process of law because
incompetency to stand trial was not an appropriate issue on which to base an indefinite
commitment. Id. at 732-39; see McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972)
(short-term commitment for psychiatric evaluation requires less stringent procedural pro-
tections than indefinite confinement); infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussion
of MdNeil).
406 U.S. at 718.
I1 d. at 719.
Id. at 719-20.
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nosis for restoration of competency made his chances for release virtual-
ly nonexistent and rendered the indefinite commitment violative of due
process.93 Jackson argued that indefinite commitment on the ground of
incompetency involved only a minimal burden on the state and placed a
heavy burden on a person who wished to challenge or terminate the
commitment. 4
In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that due pro-
cess requires extended confinement to rest upon a judicial determination
of one of the issues under the feeble-minded or mentally ill commitment
provisions 5 The Court found that a finding of incompetency justified on-
ly temporary confinement for evaluation purposes and was not an ap-
propriate basis for indefinite commitment. The Jackson Court held that
confinement for incompetency beyond a reasonable evaluation period,97
in order to comport with due process, required an additional judicial deter-
mination of Jackson's incapacity to function in the community or a poor
prognosis for a restoration of competency.99 The additional detdrmination
would be comparable to the issues under Indiana's regular civil commit-
ment provisions.99
In commitment cases, due process also requires that the nature of
the judicial hearing relate reasonably to the nature and duration of the
confinement.1°0 In McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,' the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of an ex parte hearing that resulted
in extended confinement for psychiatric examination."2 Under Maryland
law, a judge could order temporary commitment for evaluation when
reasonable cause existed to suspect "defective delinquency."'" Defective
delinquency involved repeated and extreme antisocial or criminal conduct,
an intellectual or emotional defect, and a clear danger to the community."4
' Id. at 720.
- Id. at 719, 731-38.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 726.
See id. at 739. The Jackson Court held that incompetency was a legitimate basis
only for a temporary commitment to determine the likelihood of restoration of competency.
Id. The Court, however, declined to decide what a reasonable time period would be. See id.
98 Id. at 738-39. See generally, Comment, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Dura-
tion of Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205, 212-26 (1981) (discussion of facts, holding and implications of Jackson decision).
See 406 U.S. at 738-39.
"' See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (ex parte hearing does not provide
legitimate procedural basis for extended commitment).
101 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
.. Id. at 249-50. The trial court in McNeil had ordered McNeil's commitment for evalua-
tion sua sponte based on a psychiatric examination prior to sentencing. Id. at 248 n.3.
" Id. at 247-48 & n.3; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, S 6(b) (Repl. 1976) (procedure for
temporary commitment order), amended by MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, S 8(a) (Supp. 1982).
.. 407 U.S. at 246-47; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, S 5 (RepI. 1976) (definition of defec-
tive delinquency), amended by MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1(g) (Supp. 1982).
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In addition, a defective delinquent must have committed a felony or one
of certain enumerated misdemeanors. 5 Following conviction, psychiatric
examination and a medical recommendation of indefinite commitment for
treatment of defective delinquency, the procedural elements of commit-
ment included an adversarial hearing, the right to a jury and a right of
appeal.' 8 McNeil, a convicted felon sentenced to five years imprisonment,
spent the duration of his sentence at Patuxent Institution on the basis
of an ex parte judicial determination of reasonable cause to suspect defec-
tive delinquency."' McNeil never had received a full hearing on the ques-
tion of defective delinquency because the institution had been unable to
determine whether McNeil's condition met the statutory definition.' 8 The
McNeil Court determined that the ex pa?te nature of the hearing imposed
a temporal limitation on the state's power to confine McNeil,' 0 because
due process required an adversarial hearing to legitimize an extended
deprivation of liberty in a psychiatric institution."'
Another example of a nonpunitive deprivation of liberty that is
analogous to pretrial bail for defendants is the detention or conditional
release of material witnesses. A witness is material when the witness has
personal knowledge of facts that render the witness' testimony indispens-
able, either before a grand jury to secure an indictment or at trial to
establish the prosecution's case."' Federal law concerning material
witnesses follows a due process approach by identifying an issue, requir-
105 407 U.S. at 246-47; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, 5 6(a) (Repl. 1976) (requisite of con-
viction for felony or certain misdemeanors, such as offense involving violence or second
offense for misdeameanor punishable by imprisonment), amended by MD. ANN. CODE art.
31B, S 1(g) (Supp. 1982).
10 407 U.S. at 247; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, S 8 (Repl. 1976) (commitment procedures
for defective delinquency following initial evaluation), amended by MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B,
S§ 8-9 (Supp. 1982).
10, 407 U.S. at 246-48.
"I Id. at 246, 250-51. In McNeil, examining physicians were unable to reach a conclu-
sion about McNeil's status as a defective delinquent, because McNeil would not cooperate
with the examiners. Id. at 250. As an alternative to its civil commitment power, therefore,
the state asserted authority to confine McNeil on the ground of civil contempt. Id. The
McNeil Court, however, rejected the state's assertion and held that due process would re-
quire that McNeil have an opportunity to show cause for his uncooperative conduct at an
adversarial hearing and that the state prove willful disobedience. Id. at 251.
'1 See id. at 249-50. The McNeil Court held that the observation of procedural protec-
tions applicable to short-term commitment for evaluation limits the duration of the resulting
confinement. Id The Court did not establish a fixed time limitation but noted that the revised
Maryland statute sets a maximum evaluation period of six months. Id. at 250; see MD. ANN.
CODE art. 31B, S 7(a) (Supp. 1982). At the time of McNeil's appeal to the Supreme Court,
McNeil had spent six years in confinement for evaluation. 407 U.S. at 250.
"o 407 U.S. at 250.
"1 See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938 n.5 (9th Cir. 1971) (witness with per-
sonal knowledge of matters necessary to grand jury proceeding is material); In re Cochran,
434 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Neb. 1977) (witness whose testimony was essential to state's
case against accused was material); see also SENATE REPORT, supra. note 4, at 19-20 (material
witnesses are persons with knowledge about crime that someone else has committed).
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ing a hearing and placing the burden of proof on the prosecution.,' The
Bail Reform Act encourages the release of material witnesses to avoid
unnecessary restrictions on an individual's liberty. ' Under the Act, the
same hierarchical list of conditions that applies to criminal defendants. 4
applies to the release of material witnesses."' The specific issue that the
Act identifies for determining appropriate release conditions is the
likelihood of compliance with a subpoena."' If a witness cannot satisfy
a condition of release after the prosecution has demonstrated a signifi-
cant risk of noncompliance with a subpoena, the government must resort
to a deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (Federal
Rule) 15(a), if the deposition will suffice to preserve the witness'
testimony."' The Act does not indicate clearly whether additional grounds,
such as witness safety, would justify detention or restrictive conditions
of release.' 8 The Act may contemplate witness safety as a legitimate basis
..2 See 18 U.S.C. S 3149 (1976) (first step in custody or conditional release of material
witnesses is showing by prosecution before judicial officer that witness' appearance pur-
suant to subpoena is unlikely). At common law, a court could order a person with knowledge
of facts pertinent to the prosecution's case to attend and testify at trial. 1 T. WATERMAN,
WATERMAN'S ARCHBOLD ON THE PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 38-39
(6th ed. 1853). A court could issue a warrant for the custody of a material witness pending
trial if the court found probable cause to believe that the witness would disobey a court
order to testify. Id. If the witness refused to give recognizance for his attendance at trial,
the court could commit the witness to the local jail until trial or until the witness gave
recognizance. Id. at 47-1 to 50.
I" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5 (presumption in favor of release of all persons
within scope of Act), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2295; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 19-20 (material witness' opportunity for release should be at least
as great as that for criminal defendants); cf. infra note 154 and accompanying text (presump-
tion exists in favor of defendant's release).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) (hierarchy of release conditions for criminal defendants
pending trial); see also infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text (discussion of release con-
ditions under § 3146).
"I See 18 U.S.C. S 3149 (1976) (applicability of release conditions listed in § 3146 to
conditional release of material witnesses).
"I Id.; see Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 600 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (purpose of detention of material witnesses is to ensure at-
tendance at trial); United States v. Verduzco-Macias, 463 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir.) (court may
impose conditional release or confinement of material witness only after finding that witness'
appearance at trial is otherwise doubtful), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972); Bacon v. United
States, 449 F.2d 933, 94043 (9th Cir. 1971) (material witness provisions of federal law re-
quire government to show probable cause to expect witness' unavailability or flight before
permitting custody of witness); In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Neb. 1977) (critical
issue underlying detention of material witness is effectiveness of subpoena in securing at-
tendance at trial
"I See 18 U.S.C. S 3149 (1976) (government must choose deposition instead of custody
of material witness whenever deposition adequately will preserve testimony and custody
not necessary to prevent failure of justice); accord FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (a) (court has
authority to order deposition of material witness and then order witness' release from
custody).
", See 18 U.S.C. S 3149 (1976) (detention permissible only to prevent a failure of justice).
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for detention, however, by providing that detention is permissible in lieu
of a deposition to "prevent a failure of justice." '119 The Act, therefore,
strongly favors the release of material witnesses and permits confinement
only in exceptional circumstances. 2
Federal courts have recognized that procedural protections surround-
ing custody of material witnesses derive from due process."1 Due process
requires an adversarial hearing before a judicial officer on the question
of the likelihood that a witness will disregard a subpoena. 22 In In re
Cochran,"' for example, the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska applied the fourteenth amendment due process standard to
a state material witness statute." The Nebraska material witness statute
permitted authorities to hold witnesses in jail until payment of monetary
security once a magistrate had determined that probable cause existed
Federal courts have construed S 3149 of the Act to permit detention of material witnesses
only when necessary to ensure that a witness will testify at trial. See United States v.
Verduzco-Macias, 463 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir.) (conditional release or detention of material
witness under § 3149 inappropriate unless risk of nonattendance exists), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 883 (1972); In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Neb. 1977) (prosecution must
show ineffectiveness of subpoena in securing witness' attendance at trial before custody
of witness permissible under Act); see also cases cited supra note 116 (issue in material
witness cases is risk of noncompliance with subpoena). The Act provides, however, that
the prosecution should preserve a witness' testimony in a deposition rather than confine
the witness. See 18 U.S.C. S 3149 (1976). Once the prosecution has resorted to a deposition,
therefore, the need to secure the witness' testimony no longer is an issue, yet the Act
still would permit detention to prevent a failure of justice. See id.
", See 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976) (detention of material witness permissible if deposition
inadequate or if detention necessary to prevent injustice).
'" See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (Act establishes presumption in favor
of material witness' release).
21 See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 594-98 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (holding material witness in custody is deprivation of liberty
and must satisfy due process); In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1212-14 (D. Neb. 1977)
(due process controls detention of material witnesses because detention is deprivation of
liberty). Due to loss of income, detention of a material witness may constitute a deprivation
of property in addition to a deprivation of liberty. Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight
of the Material Witness, 55 IowA L. REV. 1, 10 (1969). But see Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 588-89
(majority opinion) (because all persons have public duty to provide evidence, incarceration
of material witnesses is not "taking" of property under fifth amendment).
12" See In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1212-14 (D. Neb. 1977) (due process requires
that adversarial hearing precede deprivation of material witness' liberty); cf. Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 495-97 (1980) (procedural requirement of civil commitment process is adver-
sarial hearing because commitment is deprivation of liberty). In Vitek, Nebraska officials
had transferred a prison inmate to a mental institution for psychiatric treatment. Id. at
482. The state argued that due process protections did not attach to the transfer because
the prisoner already was in 6ustody and no longer had any liberty interest. Id. at 491-94.
The Vitek Court, however, held that a person imprisoned for punishment purposes retains
a liberty interest that requires due process to accompany a change in the nature of confine-
ment. See id. at 488-95.
12 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977).
See id. at 1212-14.
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to expect nonappearance at trial." Authorities had taken James and Nor-
man Cochran into custody as material witnesses without notice or a
hearing.12 Following the "arrest," the court appointed counsel and set
monetary bail conditions."' At a preliminary hearing, the court reduced
the amount of bail but summarily dismissed the Cochrans' motion for fur-
ther reduction of bail and release.128
The Cochran court upheld the Nebraska statute as a valid general
authorization of bail procedures for material witnesses.29 The court held,
however, that the specific procedures that the state had followed in
Cochran violated the Cochrans' due process rights. 3 ' The Cochran court
reasoned that due process requires at least notice and an opportunity to
be heard prior to the confinement of a material witness.' The court deter-
mined that the state had failed to provide both notice of the state's allega-
tions and a meaningful hearing at which a judicial officer would identify
the evidentiary bases for a decision to detain or set monetary release con-
ditions for the witnesses.32 The Cochran court, therefore, found that the
state wrongfully shifted both the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion to the parties whose liberty was at stake."=
The due process analysis that has developed in the context of civil
commitment and material witness cases is well-suited to the bail issue.13
The first step in a due process analysis is whether pretrial restrictions
on a criminal defendant's liberty involve a constitutionally protected
'1 Id. at 1209; see NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-507 to -508 (1975) (procedures for detention
of material witnesses), amended by NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-507 to -508.02 (Supp. 1982).
126 434 F. Supp. at 1209. In Cochran, police took a criminal defendant's two brothers
into custody as material witnesses, and the witnesses remained in jail over a weekend.
Id. The following Monday, a county judge set bail at $25,000 for each witness and appointed
counsel. Id. The judge made the bail determination, however, solely on the basis of the
county attorney's unsubstantiated allegations of materiality and impracticability of a sub-
poena. Id. The two witnesses then moved for a reduction in bail, challenged the constitu-
tionality of Nebraska's material witness statute and alleged a lack of evidence on the issue
of intention not to attend and testify. Id. The judge reduced bond to $15,000 each and sum-
marily dismissed the Cochrans' other claims. Id. at 1209-10. The Cochrans sought habeas
corpus relief in the federal district court. Id. at 1209.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1210.
1 Id. at 1216.
" Id. at 1212-16.
121 Id. at 1212-13. In Cochran, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
held that due process requires notice, a full evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel
before a state can hold a person pursuant to a material witness statute. See id. at 1213-14.
The court determined, however, that a right to other procedural protections, such as a
right to a direct appeal and the right to monetary compensation, did not fall within the
due process clause and depended upon state law. Id. at 1215.
12 Id. at 1216.
13 Id.
" See infra notes 135-38, 158-71 and accompanying text (application of due process
analysis to pretrial custody of criminal defendants results in balance between governmen-
tal and individual interests).
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interest." Like civil commitment and detention of material witnesses,
pretrial incarceration or conditional release of defendants constitutes a
deprivation of liberty or property.13 The second part of a due process
inquiry is a determination of the rights that attach to a defendant's liberty
pending trial."' The second step considers the nature of the interest, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest absent procedural
safeguards and the state or federal government's interest in the depriva-
tion and the avoidance of formal procedures.'38
Current federal bail procedures..9 illustrate a due process interest
balancing approach by providing a hierarchy of pretrial release measures
in noncapital cases to ensure a defendant's presence at trial.14 Under the
Act, one of the least preferred conditions of release is payment of a sum
of money from personal assets or through a bondsman.' In addition, the
Federal Rules require a reasonably prompt hearing before a judicial officer
to determine the appropriate conditions of a defendant's release pursuant
to the Act." The judicial officer who will determine the appropriate release
conditions is preferably a federal judge or magistrate.' A state judge
or magistrate with authority to try and sentence an accused for a federal
offense' may set bail conditions only when a federal judicial officer is
I' See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (first step in determining due pro-
cess rights of students was whether corporal punishment by school officials implicated con-
stitutionally recognized interest).
11 See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157 (8th Cir. 1981) (individual has interest in re-
maining at liberty prior to trial), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 445 U.S. 478
(1982); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (pretrial detention of defendants is deprivation
of liberty); supra note 56 (due process provides protection for wide range of liberty interests).
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977) (second step in due process analysis
is determination of extent of procedural protection necessary).
" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424.U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (three factors necessary to deter-
mine scope of due process rights); cf In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1213-14 (D. Neb.
1977) (applying Mathews criteria to determine due process rights of material witnesses).
" See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. SS 3141-3152 (1976).
" See id. 5 3146; see also United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747,749-50 (4th Cir. 1970)
(federal bail statute provides hierarchy of pretrial bail conditions for defendants in non-
capital cases).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) (monetary release conditions appear at bottom of hierar-
chical list of release conditions for criminal defendants); see also United States v. Abrahams,
575 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1978) (Act extablishes preference for nonmonetary bail conditions);
United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 749-50 (4th Cir. 1970) (under Act courts should
give preference to nonmonetary release conditions over monetary release conditions); Wood
v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Act envinces strong policy favoring
use of nonmonetary release conditions); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10 (goal of Act
is to establish preference for nonmonetary release conditions).
14 See FED. R. CRM. P. 5(a), 5(c) (one purpose of requirement for judicial hearing
without undue delay following arrest is to determine release conditions pursuant to federal
bail statute).
1, See id. 5(a) (federal judge or magistrate presides at hearing whenever federal judicial
officer available).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1976) (designation of state judges or magistrates authorized
to try and sentence accused for federal offense).
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unavailable. 4 , Under the Act, the preferred bail measures... are release
on personal recognizance (ROR)141 or release upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond."' A judicial officer has authority to impose conditions
of release other than ROR or an unsecured appearance bond only if the
court finds additional or alternative release conditions necessary to en-
sure the defendant's appearance at trial.' A conditional release other
than ROR or an appearance bond involves measures such as third-party
custody or supervision, temporal or geographic restrictions on a defen-
dant's activities, or restrictions on a defendant's social contacts." The
least preferred forms of conditional release are monetary security and
discretionary measures such as specified daily periods of official custody.1 51
Whenever a defendant remains in custody because he is unable to meet
a release condition, the defendant has the right to judicial review of the
condition.'52 If review does not result in modification of the condition and
release, the reviewing judge or magistrate must prepare a written ex-
planation of the refusal to amend the release condition."M
By providing a hierarchy of release measures, therefore, the Act
establishes a presumption in favor of a defendant's pretrial release.M The
, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
146 See 18 U.S.C. S 3146 (1976) (listing release conditions available to judicial officer
in order of preference); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-11 (release on personal
recognizance, unsecured appearance bond or other nonmonetary release conditions have
priority consideration over monetary or custodial bail conditions).
17 See United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 579 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (personal
recognizance is promise by defendant to appear at trial). A violation of bail conditions is
punishable as contempt or as the specific crime of "bail jumping." See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)
(1976) (violation of bail conditions punishable as contempt); id. S 3150 (separate federal of-
fense for violation of bail conditions is merely alternative to prosecution for contempt under
S 401); see also United States v. Guerrero, 517 F.2d 528, 530-31 (10th Cir. 1975) (elements
of § 3150 violation are existence of bail conditions for federal criminal defendant and defen-
dant's willful failure to comply with conditions).
148 See United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 579 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (unsecured ap-
pearance bond is promise by defendant to pay fixed sum of money upon failure to appear
at trial); Note, The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 53 IowA L. REV. 170, 181 n.75 (1967) (same).
,9 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976). The Act allows a judicial officer to establish restrictive
conditions of release only as necessary reasonably to ensure a defendant's attendance at
trial. Id. In imposing release conditions, a court considers equally factors such as the type
of offense, the nature of the evidence against the defendant and the defendant's employ-
ment history, conviction record and financial resources. Id. S 3146(b see United States v.
Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court should consider list of factors in Act
only as factors bear upon likelihood of defendant's nonappearance at trial). A court may
consider the type of offense and nature of the evidence presumably because the court already
will have made a probable cause determination prior to the imposition of any release condi-
tion other than ROR or appearance bond. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.26 (1975).
17 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
Id. 5 3146(a)(3)-(5).
15 Id. 5 3146(d).
'53 Id.
"4 See United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1978) (Act creates presump-
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standard for determining appropriate release conditions, moreover, is
reasonable assurance, rather than absolute certainty, that a defendant
will appear at trial. '55 The purpose of the Act was not to confer a right
to bail, but to modify existing bail practices to maximize a defendant's
opportunities for release on nonmonetary conditions. '56 The hierarchy of
release conditions assures that a court will release a defendant under the
least restrictive conditions necessary to minimize the risk of nonappearance
at trial.
157
Bail procedures under the Act, therefore, closely parallel the scope
of a right to bail under a due process analysis. Prior to an adjudication
of guilt, a defendant has a substantial interest in retaining his liberty.
158
Apart from the physical restraint and attendant psychological effects,
pretrial incarceration may hamper the preparation of a defense, affect
the defendant's family and deprive the defendant of income."5 9 Even a con-
ditional pretrial release constitutes a deprivation of liberty'60 or a depriva-
tion of property in exchange for liberty."6 Absent procedural protections,
no effective method of tempering unreasonable deprivations of liberty or
property exists.'62 A subsequent civil action against state or federal of-
ficials, for example, does not prevent the arbitrary infringement of a
defendant's rights and cannot compensate the defendant adequately for
tion in favor of releasing defendants under minimally restrictive conditions); United States
v. Meinster, 481 F. Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (Act creates presumption in favor
of defendant's release and effect of presumption is to assign burden of proof to prosecution
to establish significant risk of defendant's nonattendance).
1' See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (court may impose conditions upon defendant's release only
as necessary for reasonable assurance of appearance at trial); see also United States v. Alston,
420 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (standard for determining release conditions under Act
is reasonable assurance of appearance at trial, not absolute certainty).
1w See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5 (purpose of Act is to increase availability of pretrial
release), reprinted in 1966 U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2295-300; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 5-8 (purpose of Act is to revise existing bail practices by encouraging use of
alternatives to monetary bail to facilitate pretrial release for indigent defendants).
", See United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1971) (court legitimately
can impose only conditions of release that are necessary to minimize risk of nonappearance);
United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court must impose least restric-
tive release conditions that reasonably will assure defendant's attendance).
"' See supra note 136 and accompanying text (criminal defendant has liberty interest
prior to trial).
" See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (pretrial release affords defendant opportun-
ity to assist in preparation of defense); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d
Cir. 1961) (pretrial release of defendant is essential for preparation of defense); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (pretrial imprisonment of defendant stigmatizes defendant, af-
fects defendant's family and may result in loss of income).
" See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (conditional pretrial release is often
substantial deprivation of liberty); see also supra note 56 (broad definition of "liberty").
... See J. STORY, supra note 11, at 667 (monetary bail condition is exchange of proper-
ty for liberty).
112 See infra note 163 and accompanying text (civil action for unreasonable deprivation
of liberty is inadequate remedy).
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such a substantial harm.'63 Moreover, under a due process analysis,
legitimate governmental interests would include the assurance of a defen-
dant's appearance at trial,1 " protection of the public against a dangerous
individual' and prevention of improper conduct toward witnesses or
jurors.'66 Procedural protections, such as a judicial hearing, would protect
the government's interests by providing a means for determining the risk
of flight, danger or witness tampering." Any resulting financial or ad-
ministrative burden to the government is minimal, since bail procbdure
should result in corresponding reductions in the housing, feeding and super-
vision of defendants. 8' For example, when a defendant's appearance is
likely, a summons, ROR or appearance bond should provide the govern-
ment with sufficient security that the defendant will attend trial.'69 Con-
versely, when no set of monetary or nonmonetary release conditions will
be effective to minimize the risk of flight or danger to the community,
pretrial detention should be constitutionally permissible.7 A due process
" See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 690-91 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (tort action
against teacher for infliction of corporal punishment is unlikely to be either preventive
or compensatory); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961) (civil suits are ineffective remedies
for unreasonable searches and seizures). But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971) (civil action for damages is appropriate
remedy when federal officials violate person's fourth amendment rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) (authorizing suit against state officials to redress violation of federal constitutional
or statutory right).
1" See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (assurance of defendant's
attendance at trial is constitutionally permissible issue at bail hearing); United States v.
Smith, 444 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir. 1971) (governmental authority to secure defendant's ap-
pearance at trial is indisputable).
1 See People v. Melville, 62 Misc.2d 366, 374, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671, - (N.Y. Grim. Ct.
1970) (protection of community against dangerous person is valid governmental objective).
In capital cases, the Act permits a court to consider the issue of whether a defendant's
release would pose a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976). A court also
can consider the danger issue when a defendant seeks release pending appeal in both capital
and noncapital cases. Id. In the course of a decision on an application for bail pending ap-
peal, Justice Douglas asserted, in dicta, that community safety was a legitimate concern
in bail proceedings generally. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662,666 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1962) (dictum); accord Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (Jackson,
Circuit Justice 1950) (government may exercise authority to deny bail on basis of danger
to community in exceptional circumstances).
" See Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584 (D.C. 1974) (government has valid in-
terest in protecting witnesses against improper conduct by defendant).
187 See United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 6-8 (lst Cir. 1978) (bail hearing should
determine likelihood of flight or noncompliance with summons in particular case).
"I See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-2 (one policy underlying liberal release pro-
visions of Act is to reduce financial burden on government resulting from unnecessary deten-
tion of defendants pending trial).
1"9 See id. at 10 (ROR or appearance bond is often sufficient assurance that defendant
will attend trial); cf. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 945 (9th Cir. 1971) (subpoena
carries threat of contempt for noncompliance and usually furnishes sufficient impetus for
witness to appear at trial).
... See United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1978) (pretrial detention rather
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theory of bail, therefore, would not create an unconditional right to pretrial
release but would provide a right to a procedural framework within which
a court would weigh conflicting interests in a particular case.17'
In addition, judicial precedent supports the feasibility of a due pro-
cess rationale for bail.172 Even when the enunciated source of a right to
bail is the eighth amendment, federal or state statutory law, or state con-
stitutional provisions, courts have used due process as an additional check
upon specific bail practices."3 For example, when state statutory or con--
stitutional law provides a right to bail, due process protects against
unreasonable or arbitrary bail procedures.'" A state bail scheme also
violates due process when the overall scheme does not provide for a judicial
hearing to determine appropriate release conditions in a particular case."-'
In Ackies v. Purdy,171 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida addressed a challenge to a Florida county bail system,
which used a master bail schedule of offenses and corresponding fixed
than conditional release is appropriate when no set of release conditions would provide
reasonable assurance of defendant's attendance at trial).
"'1 See supra notes 137-70 and accompanying text (due process analysis of bail suggests
conditional right to pretrial release depending upon particular circumstances of case).
172 See Kelly v. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (due process protections
apply to administration of state bail system); Meechaicum v. Fountain, 537 F. Supp. 1098,
1099 (D. Kan. 1982) (applying due process clause as additional protection of state statutory
or constitutional right to bail). A few federal courts have concluded without discussion that
a right to reasonable bail conditions derives from the due process clause. See Pugh v. Rain-
water, 572 F.2d 1053, 1070 (5th Cir. 1978) (Gee, J., concurring) (both due process and equal
protection clauses contemplate right to pretrial release on reasonable conditions that will
ensure defendant's presence at trial); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1963)
(denial of right to bail violates due process); Johnson v. County of Westchester, Civ. No.
81-1222 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (due process
requires system of pretrial release); United States ex rel Kilheffer v. Plowfield, Civ. No.
74-2347 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1976) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (due process
encompasses right to bail as device for protection of defendant's liberty interests); see also
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (bail is pro-
cedural protection that reflects choice between efficient law enforcement and individual
liberty interests); Ex parte McDaniel, - Fla. -, . 97 So. 317, 318 (1923) (even ab-
sent express provision granting right to bail.in noncapital cases, due process clause of state
constitution would require bail system); J. STORY, supra note 11, at 667 (due process clause
supports right to bail).
' See Kelly v. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (once state has established
bail system, defendant has due process right to fair administration of system); Meechaicum
v. Fountain, 537 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (D. Kan. 1982) (when state defendant has statutory
or constitutional right to bail under state law, due process is additional check).
174 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (when state law confers right to bail
due process protects against arbitrary administration of system).
1 See Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (due process requires judicial
hearing to accompany imposition of pretrial release conditions); accord Ex parte Jackson,
602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1980) (en banc) (due process requires hearing on decision to grant
or deny bail).
178 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
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amounts of monetary security.177 The Ackies court noted that due process
requires an adversarial hearing in certain administrative and civil pro-
ceedings involving property interests.17 s The court reasoned that, at the
least, due process requires a comparable opportunity to be heard when
a defendant's liberty is at stake.79 The Ackies court found that a master
bail schedule eliminated the necessary case-by-case determination of
release conditions. 80 The court held that the Florida scheme was un-
constitutional, not because the fixed bail amount might be excessive in
particular cases, but because the system violated due process by failing
to establish procedural safeguards.18'
The value balancing that occurs at bail hearings is illustrative of due
process, which weighs an individual's life, liberty or property interests
against the public interest."' The due process clause, therefore, requires
a scheme of procedural protections before the government can deprive
a defendant of liberty or property to secure the defendant's attendance
at trial.8 ' The eighth amendment is merely a quantitative limit on bail
1" See id. at 40-41. In Ackies, Ackies brought a class action on behalf of Florida defen-
dants challenging the bail system in Dade County, Florida. Id. at 40. Following an arrest,
Dade County court officials would consult a master bail schedule to determine monetary
release conditions for an accused on the basis of the charges against him. Id. Records in-
dicated that defendants that were unable to meet the monetary conditions spent from several
days to several months in jail before any judicial hearing occurred. Id.
... Id. at 41.
179 Id.
189 Id. In Ackies, county officials used a master bail schedule and gave no consideration
to a particular defendant's background, employment record, or other community ties in
determining monetary release conditions for defendants. Id. at 40. The Ackies court found
that both federal and state precedent considered pretrial release an issue that requires
a judicial determination on the basis of the particular circumstances of a case. Id. at 41.
181 Id. The Ackies court held that a master schedule for monetary release conditions
violated the equal protection clause in addition to the due process clause because the schedule
resulted in discrimination, without a reasonable basis, against poor defendants. Id. at 41-42.
The court reasoned that an indigent defendant with strong community ties would be more
likely to attend trial pursuant to lenient release conditions than a wealthier person without
community ties. Id. at 42. The court noted, therefore, that a master bail schedule was not
in the state's interest because the lack of judicial determinations in particular cases might
result in release on overly lenient conditions. Id. at 41.
1" See United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(bail system is procedural protection that reflects choice between individual and govern-
mental interests); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1981) (pretrial release system
weighs individual interests against legitimate governmental objectives), vacated as moot
sub nora. Murphy v. Hunt, 445 U.S. 478 (1982).
18 See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1070 (5th Cir. 1978) (Gee, J., concurring) (due
process clause contemplates right to pretrial release on reasonable conditions that will secure
defendant's presence at trial); Johnson v. County of Westchester, Civ. No. 81-1222 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (due process clause requires
system of pretrial release for criminal defendants); Ex parte McDaniel, - Fla. - -
97 So. 317, 318 (1923) (even absent provision granting right to bail in noncapital cases, state
constitution would require bail system pursuant to due process clause); see also supra notes
135-81 and accompanying text (applicability of due process clause to pretrial release question).
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results."8 The absence of an excessive bail clause would neither diminish
nor eliminate a due process right to bail.185
PATRICIA A. REED
'' See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (eighth amendment limits amount of
bail that court may impose, but does not confer underlying right to pretrial release measures).
"I See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-66 (1977) (eighth amendment is only a
limitiation on legislative and judicial power to prescribe law enforcement measures); accord
People ex rel Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prisons, 290 N.Y. 393, 398, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (1943)
(history of bail in America demonstrates that excessive bail provision only limits amount
of bail and does not imply right to reasonable bail procedures). See generally, Duker, supra
note 7, at 77-89 (eighth amendment does not confer right to bail but depends necessarily
upon independent source for right to bail).
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